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Authors

Gossman, Patricia
Jendrzejcck, Mike
PoKempner, Dinah

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ASIA WATCH UPDATE

Patricia Gossman†
Mike Jendrzejczyk‡
Dinah PoKempner†††

The following is a transcript of a meeting organized by Human Rights Watch of California, held in Los Angeles, on Sunday, March 28, 1993. The principal speakers are from the Washington, D.C. office of Asia Watch.

Ellen Lutz:¹ The first person that I want to introduce to you of our three speakers is not principally a field worker or researcher. Mike Jendrzejczyk is the Washington director of Human Rights Watch and is responsible for all of our advocacy work in Washington, D.C. involving Asia Watch. It's a very significant component of our work because one of our key areas (since we're a U.S.-based organization) for policy pressure is in the Congress and the administration in Washington. Mike comes from a background with Amnesty International, and has been with us for a number of years.

After Mike, we have two Asia Watch researchers who will speak. Patti Gossman is our South Asia researcher; she covers India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. She returned ten days ago from a fact-finding mission to India where she has been investigating what's happening in a number of the most troubled areas. Our other speaker is Dinah PoKempner. I was very impressed when I heard her speak recently on the meaning of genocide and its application to Bosnia. Her great research love is Southeast Asia, and she has just come back from an official visit to Cambodia and Vietnam.

Mike Jendrzejczyk: My job with the new administration is to keep President Clinton honest, to be sure that there is a very active constituency in Washington that keeps human rights high on the administration's agenda. I also want to say a bit about our work in Japan. Given Japan's role in Asia and world-wide as the largest

† Research Associate, Asia Watch.

‡ Director of Asia Watch, Washington, D.C.

††† Research Associate, Asia Watch, Human Rights Watch.

1. Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, California; Adjunct Professor, UCLA School of Law; Member, Board of Advisors, UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal.

foreign aid donor (some eleven billion dollars last year), and its potential as a force for promoting human rights and democratization in Asia, Japan has been a growing priority for Asia Watch over the last few years.

I would like to give you a brief snapshot picture of how Clinton's human rights policy is beginning to evolve and provide a couple of case study examples, namely Burma and Indonesia. In the case of Burma, a country that is an international pariah, especially since Aung Sang Suu Kyi received the Nobel Peace Prize, our government has very little direct leverage or influence. So this poses a particular challenge to the new Clinton administration. The United States is now reviewing its policy towards Burma, hopefully to see how we can use our leverage at the United Nations, and through such countries as Thailand, China, and Japan, who have much more direct influence in Rangoon.

The other country, Indonesia, is one where we have a lot of potential influence on the government. However, historically we've been reluctant to use that influence, at least on behalf of human rights. There was a recent test case with the new administration on East Timor at the U.N. Human Rights Commission, which may be one indication of how the new administration is going to handle Indonesia.

During Secretary of State Warren Christopher's confirmation hearing, he referred to human rights as a basic theme of U.S. foreign policy. He talked about the problems of ethnic, religious and racial conflicts, and the need to promote democratization and human rights in nations like China and Burma. So far, however, the Administration has been crippled internally, in terms of developing a policy for Asia *per se*, because it has been very slow in getting its people in place. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for example, this week will consider the nomination of Winston Lord to be Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific. Mr. Lord used to be ambassador in Beijing under President Reagan and has a long-standing record in the foreign service. However, he's yet to be confirmed by the Senate, and therefore is not in place to actually make policy decisions, though Japan's Prime Minister Miyazawa is meeting with Clinton on April 16, and Chris Patton is coming from Hong Kong in May.

The other person who will be very important in Washington is John Shattuck, the vice-president of Harvard University, who's been named to be the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. John Shattuck used to be the director of the ACLU in Washington, D.C. and has a long track record of active concern for human rights, at one time as a member of the board of Amnesty International, U.S.A.

The third group of key players in developing administration policy will be the advisors for East Asia and South Asia at the National Security Council. In the meantime, the administration has been lurching from crisis to crisis, handling policy issues in a fairly cautious and pragmatic way, not taking high risk choices or options but rather choosing relatively low risk policies.

For our work in Asia generally, Asia Watch feels that it's important that the United States not limit its actions to unilateral approaches. I was in Jakarta last September when the Non-Aligned Movement ("NAM") Summit Meeting took place. The Indonesian government, as chair of the NAM, tried to rally many government delegations—not only from Asia but also from Cuba and Iran and elsewhere—behind the notions that 1) human rights are a universal principle but every country, every culture has its own definition of human rights, and its own idea of how to apply human rights; 2) there is a Western-led attempt, primarily at the instigation of the United States, to impose human rights standards that may be foreign to these cultures; and 3) criticism of human rights abuses is an illegitimate "interference in the internal affairs" of other sovereign nations. This is a theme that's being taken up by governments at an Asia-wide conference beginning today in Bangkok, leading up to the U.N. worldwide human rights conference due to take place in Vienna next June. How we work with other Asian governments, especially key allies like Thailand, Australia, and Japan, will be very important in shaping this debate; and for Asia Watch, represented in Bangkok by our Executive Director, it is crucial that we formulate a common approach with other non-governmental organizations ("NGO's") based in Asia.

BURMA

Burma has been under military rule since September 1988 when the military took over. Aung San Suu Kyi's opposition party won by a landslide in an election held in May 1990, but has been unable to take power. Aung San Suu Kyi remains under house arrest. Most of the elected members of parliament have either been arrested, stripped of their party roles, or forced into exile. The military government in Rangoon was censured by the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva last week by a strong, unanimous resolution that the United States actively supported. This sets the stage for further action aimed at applying pressure on the Chinese government, which is the main supplier of arms and economic aid to Burma, as well as the Thai, and the Japanese governments, which have influence over the Burmese military due to their trade and aid relationships.

In Washington last week we hosted two meetings related to

Burma that illustrate the opportunities for exerting this kind of pressure. First, we hosted a meeting by a member of the Japanese Diet, Satsuki Eda, who is an opposition politician and is very active on human rights in Japan. The day before he came to Washington he delivered a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General's office, signed by over 400 members of the Japanese Diet, including many members of the ruling party. It is a rather major breakthrough for Japan, that a significant number of Diet members would be willing to weigh in on an issue like Burma, given the historic links between Burma and Japan, and the fact that Japan is the only country in the world other than China that continues to give bilateral aid to the Burmese government.²

In February, the Thai government allowed a delegation of Nobel laureates, including the Dalai Lama and Bishop Desmond Tutu from South Africa, to come to Thailand to press for the release of Aung Sang Suu Kyi, a fellow recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. This unprecedented action put the Thai government in a rather tricky position because up until that time it has tried to avoid applying direct pressure on the Burmese government, preferring, instead, a policy of "constructive engagement." According to members of the Nobel delegation, their visit, which included meetings with the king and prime minister, has helped to trigger a debate about this policy. This is an encouraging development and one that the United States and other key allies of Thailand should support and quietly stimulate.

The Clinton Administration has a couple of key decisions to make about Burma. The United States has not had an ambassador in Burma for over two years, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has expressed opposition to sending an ambassador at this time because they feel that it will be interpreted as legitimizing the current military government. The second is whether to ban or actively discourage investment by American companies in Burma. Pepsico opened a plant in Rangoon last year. A number of U.S. oil companies are heavily involved in Burma, including Texaco and Amoco. Through their oil concessions, they provide financial support to the military government. Imposing a ban on trade or investments would be a useful way of indicating disapproval and of cutting off economic support for the Burmese government. While U.S. interests are relatively small, such a cutoff could be a signal to other Asian countries who are major trading partners, as well as the beginning of an effort to impose international economic sanctions.

2. Aid was cut off in 1988, but pre-1988 projects are still being funded and there are indications that Tokyo may be considering starting up new aid.

INDONESIA

East Timor has received heightened attention because of the actions of the Indonesian army in November 1991. The army opened fire on demonstrators at a cemetery in Dili, East Timor, killing or wounding unarmed civilians. About ten days ago, at the Human Rights Commission in Geneva, the United States had to decide whether to support a resolution condemning Indonesia for its actions, and urging Indonesia to allow U.N. human rights investigators access to East Timor (international access to East Timor is tightly restricted by the Indonesian government). A number of key senators expressed interest in this resolution, as did Asia Watch. The United States, to the great shock of Jakarta, co-sponsored the resolution which then won support from Australia, Japan, and others, and ultimately passed. A similar resolution failed to pass in Geneva last year due to a lack of support from the Bush administration.

At the same time this vote was being taken, Asia Watch had a representative in Dili observing the trial of the leader of the armed insurgency in East Timor to ensure that he was treated fairly (we do not call for his unconditional release). The fact that we were allowed to send an observer to this politically sensitive trial may have been, to some extent, a gesture by the Indonesian government designed to improve its image with the new U.S. administration.

Soon, President Clinton also will decide whether to cut off trade benefits to Indonesia because of their violations of labor rights. Asia Watch, along with a D.C.-based labor rights group, filed a petition last June calling for a cutoff of Indonesia's export tariff benefits because of its flagrant violations of labor rights. The trade law specifies that if a country is not taking steps to protect fundamental labor rights, it cannot receive Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") benefits. Indonesia exports about \$400 million worth of products to the United States annually under this program. Following hearings, inquiries by the U.S. embassy in Jakarta, and voluminous input from the Indonesian government, the decision will be announced by President Clinton in April. From our point of view, whether the Clinton administration is willing to cut off trade benefits as a way of making it clear that these benefits can continue only if basic labor rights, such as freedom of association and the ability of unions to function freely without military or police harassment or intimidation, are respected and upheld will be a crucial test with regard to Indonesia. Under the Bush administration, Indonesia's labor rights policies were reviewed, and they squeaked through.

VIETNAM

Dinah PoKempner: My main areas of research are Vietnam and Cambodia. I will begin with the first Asia Watch trip to Vietnam, which we completed in March. This was the very first time that Vietnam has allowed a U.S.-based human rights organization to visit, and it came after two and a half years of requests on our part. Although this was not a fact-finding visit as most of our trips are, we found it very productive. In this case, the purpose was to introduce ourselves to government and policy makers in Vietnam, to try to explain what human rights groups do, how they are different from political groups, and what our concerns are. We also wanted to hear them talk about human rights, and to open a dialogue so that when we report on Vietnam we will be able to send our concerns directly to the relevant ministry for comments and responses. We hope at some not too distant point in the future to be able to send researchers to actually perform field research in the country, which hasn't been possible as yet.

As far as these limited objectives go, the trip was a success. We were taken practically from the plane to a meeting with the Vice-Minister of the Interior, where we were able to discuss questions such as prison conditions and political prisoners. However, there were real limits to our dialogue, as every time we mentioned specific cases of Vietnamese political or religious prisoners we were told, "since this is your first trip it might be better not to discuss specific cases." In almost every meeting there came a point where we heard this line, but we continued to raise these cases even so.

We met a wide variety of officials and groups, among them officials from the Ministry of Justice, the Religious Affairs Committee, the Ministry of Ethnic Minorities and Highland Affairs, the Chief Procuracy in Hanoi, and the Procuracy of Ho Chi Minh City. We visited "returnees" (Vietnamese refugees who had volunteered or had been forced to return from Hong Kong) in Haiphong and Dong Nai. We met with private and government lawyers, and in both Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, panels of journalists. One of our most interesting exchanges was with intellectuals from universities and the major Communist Party think tank on our view of human rights and the Marxist-Leninist perspective. Both sides tried very hard to find common ground, and we may have found a patch, but in any event it produced a stimulating discussion. In fact, they all complained to the Foreign Ministry that too little time had been allotted for our visit—which I think shows their genuine interest in exposure to a more international understanding of universal human rights.

The general impression that we had was that the Vietnamese government doesn't present a monolithic face, there is a very wide

range of views. There are progressives interested in opening to the world, through economic reform and through bringing Vietnamese laws and policies into closer conformity with international human rights norms. Then there are people who are coming from a much more hard-line, insular perspective that flows from their war experience. They regard "human rights" and that sort of rhetoric as a political tool, used mainly for political subversion. Even within official groups, it was clear there is a range of opinion.

For example, in a discussion with journalists from the state-controlled press, we asked the editor of one party daily, "When you headline a story about a political dissident, 'Smash the Dark Schemes of the Reactionary Forces at Their Inception,' is that because of pressure on you to make a political judgment in that story?" Of course we got the response, "Oh no, there's no pressure at all on us, we try to be objective in our reporting." At that point someone from another paper stood up and said, "Well, I think you have to realize that in Vietnam we have freedom of expression and every paper has its own editorial policy." This let us know that there were differences of opinion as to this type of journalism, and that, within certain limits, some divergence from the official line was possible. The question we were interested in of course, was exactly where those limits lie, and how far they are from international norms protecting freedom of expression.

CAMBODIA

Just before the Vietnam trip, we spent about a month in Cambodia. Our previous trip was in April 1992, just at the beginning of the U.N. peacekeeping mission which culminated in a report that to our surprise was on every person's desk. On our previous visit, everyone had copies of our 1991 report, *Landmines in Cambodia*. The 1992 report described issues we felt the U.N. must address if the peacekeeping mission was to achieve one of its stated goals, the protection of human rights in Cambodia, a country that's been totally devastated in its recent history, which has suffered a massive holocaust during the Khmer Rouge era, and has been battered by war ever since. Our mission in 1993 was to evaluate the U.N.'s performance and accomplishments so far.

Unfortunately, the situation was fairly depressing. Anyone who reads newspapers knows there has been a wave of political violence as the date of elections draws nearer, and the U.N. has been largely ineffective in counteracting this violence. The Khmer Rouge have declined to participate in the peace process. As a result, Cambodia is still in a state of war, approaching a similar level of conflict as two years ago, before the Paris Accords.

There have been several steps that the U.N. has taken very re-

cently—emergency measures to try to put the lid on the violence. One has been parking U.N. police in front of political party offices, so that if you bomb the office you're going to have to bomb the U.N. policemen too. This seems to have had some effect in reducing the number of offices bombed, but it has led to opposition party members staying in the office day and night. They sleep there and seldom go out to campaign or discuss their political agenda with citizens. The other result is that instead of killing people in political party offices, attackers now target them in their homes. Or, instead of shooting guns or grenades directly into the party offices, members of the State of Cambodia military shoot over party offices, or shoot up the sign in front of the party office, or walk to the door holding a hand grenade saying, "You'd better rethink your affiliation with this opposition party," and then walk away. The effect, in terms of intimidation, is much the same. While the level of violence in February may have decreased slightly, intimidation does not seem to have dramatically abated.

The United Nations has also created a new office, the Special Prosecutor, and empowered the U.N. police to arrest people who are accused of serious political violence. There are two people in U.N. custody right now. One is a State of Cambodia policeman, who's accused of killing a FUNCINPEC Party member. The National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Co-operative Cambodia ("FUNCINPEC"), founded by Prince Sihanouk, is the royalist party which seems to be the most popular opposition group at the moment. Incidentally, the ruling party, the State of Cambodia, is the Hun Sen government, placed in power by Vietnam when it invaded Cambodia in 1979.

The second prisoner is a fellow who deserted from the Khmer Rouge and confessed on videotape that he had participated in the massacre of over a dozen ethnic Vietnamese and a couple of ethnic Khmer in a certain village.

While these two sit in custody, the U.N. is trying to find a judge that will hear a trial. The State of Cambodia judges have declined, after pressure from their own Ministry of Justice to refuse jurisdiction of these cases, and negotiations between the U.N. and the various Cambodian parties have not produced any alternatives.

As weeks of negotiations pass, the U.N. holds these prisoners under an administrative order of detention. This violates both the U.N.'s rules in Cambodia, that all suspects must have their temporary detention authorized by a court within forty-eight hours of arrest, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibits indefinite administrative detention.

At this point, the deterrent effect of U.N. prosecutions is highly questionable. There can be no trial until after the May elec-

tions even if they found a judge today, as time is needed to prepare a trial. So the only deterrent value of the new Special Prosecutor's Office lies in the U.N.'s ability to arrest people who are known to have committed acts of political violence.

Yet the U.N. is not all that willing to use its full powers to arrest people, in that the military and the police won't use force to apprehend perpetrators. Normally, when police here go to arrest someone, they can say "Halt or I'll shoot." U.N. police are not armed, and the U.N. military won't use force. There's also division within the U.N. leadership in Cambodia, with some persons insisting that the suspect's political party be notified in advance when the U.N. plans to make the arrest. For example, seven State of Cambodia military officials recently kidnapped four FUNCINPEC members and brought them to a military base. There are dozens of witnesses to the abduction who can identify the military personnel involved. When the U.N. decided to arrest these seven, it informed the State of Cambodia of its intention a week beforehand. Well, it was no surprise that on that scheduled date the only one left at the military camp was a solitary guard. The seven suspects had been transferred to the front, and are out of the U.N.'s reach.

Hence, there's reason to be skeptical about whether the creation of a Special Prosecutor is going to contain political violence. The basic problem is the pressure on the U.N. to stick to the timetable to hold elections in May, at whatever cost. According to the peace agreement, these "free and fair" elections are conditioned on a "neutral political environment," but nothing approximating a neutral environment is in place.

Because the Security Council has committed itself to May elections, whatever the environment, the U.N. is left with very little leverage. The U.N. officials on the ground cannot promise to pull out if cooperation is not forthcoming. All they believe they can do is to cajole, persuade, and bluff, and stick in there until the end of May. Without greater resolve to address the very serious abuses in Cambodia on the part of the international community and the U.N. itself, the prognosis is fairly depressing, but we'll have to see what happens during the elections. *(Developments since the March 28th Asia Watch meeting: Turnout for the elections was enormous, confounding all expectations. Although the Khmer Rouge had initially threatened people not to participate in the elections, in a last minute reversal they actually encouraged voting. At the time of this writing, the FUNCINPEC party had won just under half the vote, with the State of Cambodia a close second. As no party controlled a majority, intense jockeying for coalition partners began, and the situation remained very unstable, with attacks against U.N. peacekeepers continuing and the Khmer Rouge threatening to resume war.)*

SOUTH ASIA

Patti Gossman: As Ellen said, I cover South Asia, a part of the world in which the United States has few foreign policy interests at the moment, and where U.S. news coverage tends to be limited to periodic eruptions of communal violence in India. Unfortunately those have been on the rise. I would like to focus today on issues in India that led to the current tensions related to the destruction of the Babri mosque on December 6, 1992, and the riots which followed. The violence has raised fears of continuing attacks against religious minorities, particularly Muslims, because of the growing strength of the Bharatiya Janata Party ("BJP"), a Hindu nationalist party, and its allied political groups, which are determined to push for early elections in the hope of winning power and creating a Hindu state.

There are 110 million Muslims in India, many of whom now feel threatened as a result of these recent events. It is important to understand that the violence is not simply the result of actions by private individuals or uncontrollable mobs. The real problem is that the state has been complicit in acts of violence against targeted groups. In the recent riots, as in similar cases over the years, police and other government officials have either participated in the attacks or refused to intervene to prevent the violence from taking place. Unfortunately, the Indian government has never really taken action that would serve to deter or to make clear to these kinds of security forces that this kind of behavior will not be tolerated. On the contrary, high ranking politicians have been involved in promoting groups which preach religious intolerance.

The area of crisis in India that I have focused on most in the past couple of months is somewhat related to this continuing issue of religious and ethnic conflict in India. It is Kashmir, where the kinds of the abuses and the pattern of killings, torture, and disappearances brings to mind human rights conditions more commonly associated with other parts of the world, like Central America. While not as severe as abuses that took place during the worst years of war in Guatemala or El Salvador, human rights violations in Kashmir are still among the worst anywhere in Asia and show no signs of abating. Unfortunately, Kashmir is a part of the world that does not get much attention here.

Kashmir is the disputed part of India and Pakistan which was left undecided at the time of the creation of the two countries in 1947. Both countries claim it; Pakistan now holds on to about one-third of it, India the other two-thirds. However, many of the people who actually live there believe that their views have never really been taken into consideration by any international or national body. That is the root of the problem.

The present conflict, which is a low-intensity civil conflict, erupted in late 1989 and early 1990 after years of corruption and rigged elections by the Indian government. The government crackdown was in response to rising violence by armed militant groups—some of which have received arms and training from Pakistan. As these groups stepped up their attacks on the security forces and government institutions, the government cracked down with extremely brutal force. In January 1990 there were repeated incidents of Indian security forces opening fire on unarmed demonstrators, killing hundreds of Kashmiris, ultimately ensuring that the crisis escalated into a genuine civil war.

Since then, appalling abuses of this kind have continued. Asia Watch was the first international human rights group to conduct fact-finding missions in the state; our latest mission was carried out jointly with the Physicians for Human Rights (“PHR”). India officially does not permit investigations by outside human rights groups. Amnesty International has not been allowed to do investigations in India for twelve years. Asia Watch and PHR went in on tourist visas. I travelled there in December 1990, and again just last October.

When I traveled to Kashmir in 1990, the abuses I documented were among the worst I had seen anywhere. By 1992, conditions have worsened dramatically. In part, these abuses are the consequence of a policy of deploying poorly trained federal police and border security forces into Kashmir, rather than the army, to conduct counter-insurgency operations. These troops are instilled with the idea that they are fighting Pakistan, and as in the case of guerilla wars everywhere, they come to treat civilians as the enemy. There is great sympathy among the local population for the militant organizations, not necessarily because the people favor Pakistan but because they are alienated from India because of the brutal behavior of the security forces, which they see as an occupying force. The result is that the security forces routinely target civilians. Asia Watch and PHR documented frequent instances of reprisal attacks against civilians—massacres in which security forces enter a village, shoot anyone in sight, rape the women, and burn down the houses. These attacks are not just aberrations or occasional lapses in which the security forces go berserk. There is a systematic pattern to the attacks, particularly in the winter when the troops also engage in arson as part of a deliberate effort to break support for the militants among the local population. Naturally, this abusive behavior produces the opposite effect—the more brutal the security forces act, the more the people feel alienated and driven to the point where there is little prospect of political negotiation.

There are thousands of people detained in Kashmir and torture is routine. Torture includes electric shock, severe beatings, and

burning with heated objects. The doctor who accompanied me from PHR examined some of the victims of torture. A number of the victims had been treated for kidney failure which had developed as a result of the severe beatings to which they had been subjected. When muscle tissue has been badly damaged or crushed, it releases toxins which in sufficient quantity can be lethal to the kidneys. The doctor examined a number of patients who were on dialysis because of the severe beatings they had suffered in custody. This kind of abuse is routine and is facilitated by the fact that people taken into custody are held in secret detention camps run by the security forces and may not be released for weeks, if they are released at all. The worst aspect of all of this is that the tortured are the lucky ones. Following cordon and search operations, it has become increasingly common to find a number of detainees shot dead the next day.

Monitoring and documenting the abuses or doing any kind of human rights work in Kashmir has become very dangerous for Kashmiris. There are a few human rights activists who have been trying to publicize the abuses, but they do so at great risk to themselves. Even as an observer, one is at risk. I discovered this when I attempted to photograph a funeral procession which had formed following the killings of three or four young men who had been executed after being taken into custody the day before. As the procession forms, the mourners march to the U.N. observer office, which is nothing more than a handful of troops whose only role is to monitor the ceasefire line between India and Pakistan. But because people in Kashmir feel that they have nowhere else to turn to convey their desperation and grievances, the funeral processions head toward the U.N. office. The security forces routinely break up these demonstrations, sometimes by beating people, often by using tear gas, and sometimes by shooting. While I was photographing this particular demonstration, the troops first fired tear gas and then, as people began to disperse, the troops opened fire. Instantaneously, one hundred unarmed people dropped to the ground, because everyone knows that when the soldiers open fire, they almost always shoot to kill. Fortunately, no one was killed that time.

When Asia Watch was in Kashmir, we worked with a number of human rights people, who are among the bravest people anywhere in light of the work they do. Two prominent human rights activists have been killed since December 1992, and a well-known political leader who was outspoken about human rights has also been assassinated. The first was Hirdai Nath Wanchoo, a retired civil servant, a Hindu, who had dedicated the last several years to just keeping records of people who were taken into custody and killed, and filing habeas corpus petitions in court for people who had been detained. In some cases he succeeded in getting the courts

to order the security forces to produce prisoners in court, but the security forces ignored the court's orders. Nevertheless, H. N. Wanchoo continued to file petitions and document cases, just to keep a record of the people who had been killed, detained, or disappeared.

H. N. Wanchoo was killed on December 5, 1992. He left his home with two men and was found shot in the head a half-hour later. The government has tried to blame the murder on one of the militant groups, but Asia Watch was informed by a senior government official that the killing was ordered and carried out by the head of the Border Security Force. Although any prominent case of unnatural death should be subject to judicial inquiry, the government has refused to order such a judicial investigation. Obviously, their refusal to do so raises serious questions about government complicity in the assassination.

On February 18, Dr. Farooq Ashai, a prominent surgeon who had met with international groups and journalists to publicize cases of torture, was killed by government troops as he slowed down at a security post on a bridge. He was traveling in a hospital car marked with a red cross at the time. Moreover, the soldiers prevented his wife, who was also in the car, from bringing Dr. Ashai to a hospital in time. Doctors later said that if Dr. Ashai had received prompt medical care, they might have been able to save him.

(Developments since the March 28th Asia Watch meeting: On March 31, 1993, Dr. Abdul Ahad Guru, another prominent surgeon, was abducted by unidentified gunmen and shot dead. Dr. Guru had been a leading member of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, and an outspoken critic of India's human rights record in Kashmir. It is not possible to say who was responsible for the assassination, as both the security forces and militant groups may have had a motive. However, once again, the government has failed to order a judicial inquiry.)

One of the reports Asia Watch and PHR published recently focuses on assaults on medical workers in Kashmir. Security forces routinely enter hospitals, arrest people from hospitals, and have even opened fire on ambulance drivers. In one case we investigated, an ambulance driver who was trying to collect three wounded people was stopped by security forces. When he explained why he was there, the soldiers agreed to let him take the injured persons to the hospital, but as he attempted to do so, they opened fire. The ambulance driver was shot in the abdomen and wrist. He managed to get to a hospital for treatment, but we do not know what happened to the people he was trying to help.

Recently the Indian government promised to set up a human rights commission to look into these abuses. However, it is not

clear whether this body will have any independent investigatory powers. Unfortunately the record of international human rights commissions set up by governments around the world is not very good. Most governments see this as a way to whitewash the problem and show the international community that they are doing something to curb the abuses. It would be unfortunate if the Indian government used the commission only as a tool to respond to criticism, rather than as an institution to defend and uphold human rights. One of the most serious concerns is whether the commission will have the power to investigate abuses by paramilitary and military forces, the most serious human rights violations taking place in India.

Let me just say something briefly about the other areas of South Asia that I focus on. When communal riots and conflicts break out in India, the largest and politically most influential country in the South Asia region, it impacts all of its neighbors. For example, following the communal disturbances after the riots in India, there were similar outbreaks in Pakistan.

Pakistan also has many human rights problems very similar to those found in India, particularly the abuses by its police and paramilitary forces. Religious minorities in Pakistan are increasingly at risk of abuses that range from restrictions on freedom of expression to violent attacks. After the recent wave of violence in India, Hindus in Pakistan have felt more vulnerable. Other religious groups in Pakistan are also at risk. Under Pakistani interpretations of Islamic law, persons may be tried and sentenced, even to death, for blasphemy. Asia Watch has been very concerned about a number of such cases, including noted writers as well as members of minority religious communities.

Another issue Asia Watch is very concerned about is the situation of women in Pakistan. In October 1992, Asia Watch and the Women's Rights Project of Human Rights Watch investigated a large number of cases of women who had been raped and tortured while in police custody. Under Islamic law in force in Pakistan, it is easy to accuse a woman of sexual crimes on very little evidence. Although she may eventually be acquitted, by that time she may have spent several years in prison, and would have likely been raped and tortured while in custody. Those who are jailed are often poor women who are not able to pay off the police. We have had a very difficult time getting the Pakistan government to pay much attention to these cases. At the same time, changes in U.S. policy toward South Asia may be instrumental. Pakistan is desperate to get back in better graces with the U.S. government, and Asia Watch uses this to pressure the Pakistani authorities to make significant changes.

One last word on Afghanistan, which has nearly vanished from the news, despite the fact that the U.S. pumped billions of dollars

and several billion tons of weapons into the country. Afghanistan is a difficult country to work on right now because conditions there border on anarchy, and may be verging toward a humanitarian disaster on the scale of Somalia. I have had meetings with U.N. officials in Islamabad and Peshawar who repeatedly described the situation in Kabul as resembling Mogadishu. Rival *mujahadin* rebel leaders who seized control of Kabul about a year ago continue to attack civilians of different ethnic groups aligned with opposed factions.

Women have been taking the brunt of the anarchy prevailing in Kabul. We have heard reports of rape and other attacks. One official told me that "what the Serbs are doing to the Muslims in Bosnia, the Muslims are doing to the Muslims in Kabul, only nobody cares because it's not on the television screens. It's not in the newspapers."

Given the extent of the U.S. role in arming Afghanistan, it is unconscionable for the United States not to be concerned about the kind of abuses those weapons are contributing to. Among the most serious concerns is the land mine situation. The International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") reports a tripling of land mine injuries in the last year, with, again, very little international attention to the problem from outside.

QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION

Lutz: Before we go to general questions I'd like to just ask each of the presenters to take one or two minutes to touch on both what the United Nations is doing or should be doing in the countries that you're working on, because each of them have referred very briefly to U.N. presence in one way or another. The U.N. is aware of what's happening. However it also appears that the U.N. is not focused on Asia in the way that it's focused, say on Bosnia, or other areas.

PoKempner: Regarding Vietnam, one of the real pressures on the leadership has been its accession to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Much of Vietnam's reform penal legislation—its first real criminal code and its first criminal procedure code—was drafted with a view towards the reporting deadline for the U.N. Human Rights Commission on that covenant. Indeed, much of their report focused on the provisions of these codes, many of which provide important protections. The problem is that these protections are generally unenforced, much like constitutional protections that are not used in practice. Vietnam is very eager to join the world community. Its interest in signing international treaties, such as the Torture Convention, could play an important role in changing the view of what is acceptable official practice.

But right now Vietnam's major policy concern is the lifting of the embargo. The United States, as you know, has no diplomatic relations with Vietnam, and has engineered a ban on all world financial and institutional lending. This has very much crippled Vietnam's ability to develop. The infrastructure remains at a very low level, so that even though most of the rest of the world is ignoring the U.S. embargo, development is by necessity limited.

As a result, Vietnam is very much focused on normalizing relations with the United States, which gives our country a unique opportunity to raise human rights concerns. Asia Watch considers the embargo to have been imposed for political considerations that had nothing to do with human rights, and we do not advocate imposing new human rights conditions on lifting the embargo at this point. But inevitably, Vietnam's human rights record will be at center stage in the political debate on normalizing relations, and we should encourage Vietnam to make real progress on this issue as part of developing relations with the United States.

My prior comments on the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Cambodia probably answered your question. One action the U.N. should take is to report more clearly and completely on the kinds of abuses that are going on. If the situation is hopelessly beyond its control, that ought to be acknowledged sooner rather than later. Part of the problem with the whole U.N. operation is the pressure from the permanent five members of the Security Council to hold the elections in Cambodia at any cost. The U.N. should not let its protective role be compromised by parties that are intent on committing flagrant abuses. Unless it is possible to question the premise of the entire U.N. mission, that is, cooperation by the parties, it will be very difficult to act effectively against abusers.

It's difficult to find the "peace" in this peace-keeping mission. We rode back from one town with a Tunisian policeman who seemed to us a victim of combat fatigue. In the course of the last month, he had been in a jeep that had struck a freshly-laid land mine which blew his colleague's leg off. He had been sent to protect an election registration team in Siem Reap province that was caught in a crossfire between the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh government and had spent three days in a trench. The U.N. helicopters wouldn't rescue them because it was too dangerous, he was told. Another policeman, one of his friends, was shot through his hands as he held them saying "U.N.—Don't shoot!" in an attack that killed two female U.N. electoral workers.

This is the context for this particular peacekeeping mission. Most Cambodians appeared eager to have the chance to vote, but at the same time, the situation is very dangerous, and it will remain dangerous after the elections, no matter who wins. Unless the inter-

national community puts some teeth into U.N. sanctions, I don't think that the situation is going to improve radically.

Gossman: The U.N. is one of the few international bodies currently working in Afghanistan. But because Afghanistan has vanished from the radar screen for the rest of the world, the U.N. does not have any outside support from its members to really push it to do what it should do.

U.N. workers have come under attack in Afghanistan too. The U.N. has had to withdraw from a number of areas where it had operations in Afghanistan because of the deteriorating security situation. The U.N. has not been in Kabul since last August when Kabul was being shelled heavily; 2000 people died in that month alone. It did not make the press, but that is not unusual. This past February, four U.N. workers were killed on the road between Peshawar and Jalalabad. As a result, the U.N. has had to scale back a great deal in Afghanistan. But like Somalia, without world focus on the country, the U.N. operates in isolation; it is going to be very difficult to have any reconstruction or concern for human rights as long as no one on the outside watches or cares about what happens in Afghanistan.

A critical issue is the land mine situation. The U.N. and other humanitarian groups are currently trying to demine, but do not have enough resources. The entire country is literally a minefield. The Soviets scattered mines from helicopters and planted land mines without any markings; many of the *mujahadin* did the same. Refugees, who return to farm, come across the mines and are killed or maimed. That has been the pattern.

As far as India is concerned, there is not much opportunity for the U.N. to play any role. Although Kashmir is a disputed territory and U.N. resolutions are currently pending, any attempt to bring it up before the U.N. is futile because of the way the conflict has evolved between India and Pakistan. Efforts at the U.N. tend to be viewed as instigated by Pakistan, whose own hands are not exactly unbloodied in Kashmir. As a result, there is little opportunity for other countries to join in any U.N. effort on Kashmir. It has become deadlocked between India and Pakistan.

However, international attention should be focused on pressuring India and Pakistan to cooperate in allowing international organizations access to Kashmir, especially groups like the ICRC, and the U.N. working groups on disappearances and arbitrary detention. Even if the Kashmir conflict may be difficult to resolve, there are things that can be done on the ground to protect human rights.

Jendrzejczyk: With regard to Indonesia, and East Timor specifically, the Secretary General's office has convened talks between the Portuguese, the former colonial power in East Timor, and the

Indonesian government. Despite U.N. resolutions passed by the General Assembly condemning Indonesia's annexation of East Timor in 1976, and despite the ongoing talks convened by the Secretary General, there doesn't seem to be any real prospect for settling the underlying political problem in East Timor. (*Asia Watch takes no position on the political status of East Timor, per se.*)

Meanwhile, there are thousands of Indonesian troops occupying a relatively small part of an island. People are generally fearful of saying anything. Last year, the U.N. sent Amos Waco, the Attorney General from Kenya, as an envoy to East Timor. However, many East Timorese were afraid to approach him and tell him what they knew about the massacre at the cemetery in Dili.

The resolution recently passed in Geneva called for the Indonesian government to cooperate with Mr. Waco, who is going back to conduct further investigations. It also urged the Secretary General to release the first report filed by Mr. Waco, which is now confidential.

One concrete step the U.N. could now take is to simply release this report, put the information on public record, and then hold the Indonesian government accountable. Many in Jakarta suspect that the reason why the military has never identified dozens reported to be missing after the Dili massacre is that they were killed, their bodies dumped in the sea or in mass graves, as a cover-up.

In this situation, the U.N., at a minimum, has a responsibility to go beyond conducting inquiries or investigations. They should also make public more of the information that they gather so that the Indonesian government will be forced to answer questions it has been avoiding.

Regarding Burma, the U.N. has actually done quite a bit. The General Assembly has passed resolutions, and the U.N. Human Rights Commission has twice censured Burma. Unfortunately, the resolutions themselves don't do very much, when normal investment, trade, and especially arms continue to keep the military government in power. They do, however, provide an international framework for further action. There has been talk within the European Community, by Australia, and other countries, about moving towards a U.N.-sponsored arms embargo. The Nobel delegation to Thailand supported this idea. (I would add that lots of people have dirty hands here, beyond the Chinese; even the Polish government sold helicopters to Burma last July, ostensibly because they needed the foreign currency.)

The problem with getting this kind of sanctions regime through the U.N. is that you have to go to the Security Council, where China has veto power. Since China is the main supplier of arms, having sold as much as a billion dollars worth of arms, the

prospect of China vetoing an attempted embargo has kept the whole idea off the agenda.

But perhaps now is the time to put China in the spotlight. If in fact they want to stand up in defense of the Burmese government, let them do that. Let them be stigmatized! As a step in that direction, the General Assembly could press for a resolution—in which China could not veto—urging all member states to exercise voluntary restraint and to refrain from transferring arms to Burma.

The other area where the U.N. has been involved in a substantive way has been helping the Rohingya refugees from Burma. Nearly 300,000 Muslim refugees from the Arakan state, who are a minority in a primarily Buddhist country, have fled systematic rape, torture, and killing by the Burmese army, and are now in refugee camps in Bangladesh. The U.N. has been trying to work out an arrangement whereby they can safely return to Burma. Last spring, Burma and Bangladesh reached a bilateral repatriation agreement, which they have tried to implement, in the face of opposition by refugees who have protested and demonstrated in the camps. Some have been arrested or shot by Bangladeshi police.

The problem is that the Burmese government will not allow the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) to station monitors on the Burmese side of the border to observe what happens to the Rohingya refugees when they go back, thus providing some measure of protection. Last September, the Bangladeshi government started forcing the refugees to go back against their will. There now are negotiations going on between Bangladesh and the UNHCR, to work out some kind of repatriation agreement which would make it safe for them to go back if they want. (*An agreement was reached in late April.*) But without any effective, international presence in Burma, and without confidential interviewing procedures in Bangladesh to ensure that any returns are voluntary, the Rohingya refugees are stuck in refugee camps that are becoming less and less viable and hospitable.

In 1978 and 1979, a very similar scenario took place. Refugees from Arakan were forced out of Burma and into Bangladesh. Thousands of deaths resulted when the Bangladeshi government cut their food rations and starved them out. The international community cannot stand idly by and let another humanitarian disaster occur.

This continuing crisis, which, like Afghanistan has had little international publicity, has become a focus of concern for Indonesia, Malaysia, and other Muslim countries in the region. This has a sort of silver lining to it because those countries have a great deal of influence within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”). The annual ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting will

be taking place this summer. Acting in the context of ASEAN, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand could do much more to solve this immediate crisis, and more importantly, to do something about the real heart of the problem—the continuing military rule in Burma. Hopefully, ASEAN's "constructive engagement" approach to Burma will be reassessed.

1. *Question regarding the practical effect of Vietnam acceding to international covenants.*

PoKempner: Just as in many countries, the requirements of international human rights treaties are very often ignored. Yet there are people in Vietnam's government who are aware that their country's practice falls far short of the requirements of international law. That produces some feeling of obligation on their part to respond to criticism and to institute the reforms they can within their own political system. But the essential problem is that those in power are extremely concerned about losing control.

Although there are people within the government who are pushing law reform or education of the judiciary, basic problems remain unsolved: party control of the whole justice system, corruption, and an unwillingness of the security forces to change their practice. Vietnam, like many socialist countries, has a system of unity of powers; the judiciary is not independent from the executive branch and the Party dominates each institution of government. There is no practical check or balance to the police or the courts, which is the root of many problems.

2. *Question about Dr. Doan Viet Hoat, a Vietnamese political prisoner, and whether U.S. lawyers will be able to go to Vietnam to observe or participate in his trial.*

PoKempner: Dr. Doan Viet Hoat is a respected academic and the creator of an underground newsletter called *Freedom Forum*, and for this reason he and a number of other intellectuals in Ho Chi Minh City were arrested. We issued a report on their case several months ago. The government of Vietnam has denied our request, which we made just days after leaving Ho Chi Minh City, to observe his trial. (*Note: In June 1993, Vietnam postponed Dr. Hoat's appeals hearing, not responding to requests from U.S. lawyers and Asia Watch to attend the proceedings. In the meantime, Dr. Hoat's physical condition has seriously deteriorated, as a result of a pre-existing kidney disorder and his confinement in a tiny damp cell in Chi Hoa prison, which he shares with two other inmates, and is not allowed to leave, even to use an exterior toilet.*)

Jendrezczyk: A number of senators and the State Department have basically been told that no visas will be granted, either

for Vietnamese-American lawyers whom Dr. Hoat's family asked to help, or for us, since Asia Watch has also requested to send an observer. Meanwhile we're trying to get press attention. We talked to the BBC this morning to put them in touch with his brother.

PoKempner: We've also alerted the foreign press community in Hanoi. This development was extremely disappointing, coming right on the heels of our first visit. Even during our trip, the government denied our request to see a recently freed political prisoner.

- 3. Question about Kashmir. India is trying to make this into a religious war, which it is not. When the mosque was destroyed there were riots in India, there were riots in Pakistan, there were riots in England, but nothing happened in Kashmir. The Kashmiris have been all along a very humane and secular people. How do we get policy makers in Washington to pay attention to Kashmir and what should their policy be?*

Gossman: Just a comment. You are right that it is not a religious war. It is a consequence of the Indian government's failure to deal with legitimate minority demands, and to deal with the problem in Kashmir through means other than brute force, rigged elections, and corrupt government. Unfortunately, if things move in the direction that they are headed now, with the prospect of a central government that will take the line that India should be a Hindu state, the prospects for Kashmir will be even grimmer.

The attitude of the security forces in Kashmir has been to treat the population as somehow anti-national and in league with Pakistan. It has been part of the government's policy toward Kashmir to treat the question of its separate identity or status only as part of its conflict with Pakistan. As in the case of the communal riots elsewhere in India, it is important to bear in mind how religious symbols have been used for political ends.

Jendrzejczyk: In terms of the U.S. government, it's true the Indians are now very much courting the Clinton administration. Their people are all over Capitol Hill trying to establish good relations, making sure that senators and congressmen are aware of Indian constituents in their states or in their districts. They are anxious to obtain trade, the support of the World Bank, and so forth. Meanwhile, the Clinton administration doesn't have a clear policy towards India other than its interest in promoting trade. I think it views India as an important democracy in Asia.

The area which I believe the ground has shifted a bit—and the Indian government is obviously aware of this—is that some of India's major defenders in the Congress are no longer in a position to prevent scrutiny and pressure on India's human rights practices as they have in the past. This provides us with a narrow but nonethe-

less crucial opening to simply say India is accountable in a way that any other country is. If these human rights problems are not dealt with, for example, if the ICRC is not allowed to go to Kashmir, is something the United States government and Congress has to take up with the Indian government.

Concrete specific issues, like ICRC access to Kashmir, are areas where we think our government can play an important role. For example, we briefed a number of Senators who visited India last December, and had a meeting with Prime Minister Rao, and specifically asked about getting the ICRC into Kashmir. There were immediate attempts by the embassy to follow up on this request. That's the kind of action I think that we can stimulate and that the Indian government will be sensitive to. How we do it, and the context in which we do it, must be handled very carefully, because of this complicated situation that Patti has described vis-a-vis the U.S. and India and Pakistan.

4. *Question: Is it not true that the U.N. Development Program ("UNDP") is very involved in Burma, and if so is it not operating at cross-purposes with what we are talking about?*

Jendrezczyk: Yes, the UNDP does have people on the border, and they are engaged in activities at a fairly low level. There was an attempt in the last year to expand the program dramatically. But a five-year plan was shot down in New York, because of the fact that there's a general consensus that the U.N. can't be condemning the military government on one hand and helping it on the other. I understand that the program is very small scale and is supporting humanitarian projects only.

There's also a broader debate going on in Europe about whether the Burmese economy is such a disaster, and people are being hurt so badly, that there should be some attempt by some humanitarian private voluntary organizations to go into Burma. The problem is that to do so you have to cut a deal with the military, which gives them greater legitimacy.

5. *Question: Can you clarify whether the Hun Sen government is the Cambodian state power?*

PoKempner: Right, the State of Cambodia.

6. *Question: The primary opposition force is the party that is headed now by Prince Sihanouk?*

PoKempner: He actually left the party when he became the chairman of the Supreme National Council, that is, the coalition that nominally embodies Cambodia's sovereignty, but yes, that is

the party that he formed, and is now headed by his son, Ranarridh. And most Cambodians understand it to be the party of Sihanouk, however much he's separated himself.

7. *Question: Including the Khmer Rouge, are those the three primary contending forces in Cambodia?*

PoKempner: Right. There's also the Khmer People's Liberation Front (known now as the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party), and the Khmer People's Liberation Armed Forces (known now as the Liberal Democratic Party) which is a split-off. These were heavily U.S.-backed groups. The Khmer People's Liberation Front is headed by Son Sann, a former prime minister of Cambodia. That party, with the three you mentioned, are the components of the Supreme National Council, and also the most important political forces in the country. But there are also sixteen new small political parties that have sprung up since the U.N. mission.

8. *Question: Is there still the Khmer Serei . . . ?*

PoKempner: The Khmer Serei, or "Free Khmer" was the name given to various groups of resistance guerrillas and outlaws based on Cambodia's borders. These groups date back to Sihanouk's time, and for the most part were organized or merged into the non-communist opposition movements we were discussing before.

9. *Question: From what you've said, is the State Party as well as the Khmer Rouge guilty of human rights violations as far as you can tell?*

PoKempner: I would have to say that all of the parties are guilty of gross abuses, there's no doubt about that. The noncommunist groups were also extremely corrupt, lawless and violent in the small zones or refugee camps under their control. For example, in the Thmar Pouk region, which is a center for the KPLF but also has heavy FUNCINPEC and Khmer Rouge presence, there are, according to U.N. officials, as many as four or five unexplained murders per week. Dead bodies just show up all the time. There are no prisons in this region, or rule of law. The U.N. police find that people are routinely shot for theft, or captured and tied to trees.

But the Khmer Rouge record is unique in terms of the scale of devastation of the country and people. Anywhere from a seventh to an eighth of the population died during the Pol Pot era, from 1975 to 1979.

As for the State of Cambodia's human rights abuses, it has operated very oppressive prisons, and has been involved in the sup-

pression and detention and killing of political opponents. This has become very visible since the U.N. mission; clearly there's been an escalation of political murder, as officials with the State of Cambodia sense that they may face real rivals in these opposition groups for the affections of the electorate.

10. *Question on Kashmir: . . . what about sending clothing and emergency aid to Kashmir?*

Gossman: While there have been terrible effects on the civilian population because of the fighting in Kashmir, there is no shortage of food or clothing. Of course the conflict has devastated the economy of the state, which is based primarily on tourism. In our report, Asia Watch and PHR assessed the medical situation in the state. There are shortages, but not dire shortages of medicine. There are problems with overcrowding in the hospitals, simply because of the influx of casualties from the conflict and because many health care workers have fled the state. Some have fled because of threats from militant groups, others have fled just because of the conflict. The most important group to assist in medical care would be the International Committee of the Red Cross.

11. *Comment from member of audience*

Several times the presenters have referred to the human rights conventions. There's kind of a golden opportunity in front of us now because there are four of these that are coming up for ratification. There is a convention to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women. There is a convention to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination, a covenant on economic, social and cultural rights, and a convention on the rights of the child. Now, the way these things will get ratified is if people write to their senators and put pressure on them, and urge them to put pressure on the administration.

One of the good parts of these particular conventions, as I see it anyway, is that when the United States ratifies these conventions, there is a compliance procedure which starts up, and the United States then would periodically be required to report to the U.N. Human Rights Commission ("UNHRC") on its compliance. Then organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and others can come before the commission and say their side, that there's no compliance. That would be very embarrassing to a country.

This can help bring the United States into the U.N., instead of standing on the sidelines as we have done up to now. Some of the problems that we're talking about can be nipped in the bud before

they start, if the United States is an exemplary part of the international community.

Jendrzejczyk: Your former senator, Alan Cranston, was a champion of human rights in the Senate for many years. He was the chair of the foreign relations subcommittee dealing with East Asia and the Pacific.

He's now retired, but you have two highly visible senators, Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer. It's crucial that they know that they have constituents back here in California who care about what they do vis-a-vis human rights, who will praise them if they do the right thing and criticize them if they do the wrong thing.

You have no idea the way Ross Perot has changed the political culture in Washington. Everybody is now glued to their fax machines, their phones, and their constituent mail in a way that they have never been before. If they get ten letters about Kashmir, or five letters about how the United States should support a resolution at the General Assembly calling on member states not to sell arms to Burma, believe me, you will get an answer to that letter, and they may actually take some action.

Now that there's so much focus on domestic issues, expressions of citizen concern on foreign policy questions are more important than ever. Otherwise, these international human rights questions tend to get pushed to the margins unless and until they erupt as a crisis. Bosnia and Somalia may have attention on the Hill for the moment, and they have the National Security Council and the White House scrambling. But then the crisis goes away, and it fades from the screen. Human rights in Kashmir, Afghanistan, even Vietnam, with the exception of the narrow issue of the embargo, will only be on the agenda if the press puts it there, or if American citizens make it clear to our politicians that the United States in the post-Cold War era has a key and unique role to play promoting human rights, using its substantial leverage, working with the U.N., and working with other countries. That's a message that has got to get through.